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Lecture for the delegation of the Indonesian Ministry of Environmental Affairs, 
held at january 12, 2004, at Maastricht University by Gert-Jan Veerman1. 
 
 
A Conceptual Framework for the Quality of Legislation. 
 
The content of this lecture is as follows: 
1. Indicators for the Quality of Legislation in the Netherlands 
2. Indicators in other bodies 
3. Some comment 
4. Impact of the framework 
5. Final remarks 
 
 
1. Indicators for the Quality of Legislation in the Netherlands 
 
Since the fifties of the last century, a policy for the quality of legislation has been developed 
in the Netherlands. It started in 1951 with recommendations about especially the shape and 
language of the laws and other regulations. That language should be clear and cristal. That is 
necessary for the accessibility of laws and it possibly provides some harmony within the field 
of regulation. There were about 14 ministries and all of them had more or less their own legal 
traditions. In Holland the ministries make their own laws and other regulations.  
In the eighties, when the reorganization of the Dutch civil service was, also then, under 
discussion, the policy of quality of legislation got an organizational component. Quality of 
legislation should also be promoted by organizational means: a responsible minister, some 
civil servants, a common commission with legal experts as representatives of the ministries.  
In ’84 more substantial adages or maxims were formulated, to encourage that ministries 
would aim at less regulation. All ministries had to put their legal drafts under a ‘deregulation-
check’ by the ministry of Justice. From 1987 this check was broadened and executed by an 
independent Committee (CTW). Since 1994 the policy-department for the quality of 
legislation is occupied with this check. 
 
In 1991 a new element was introduced by the minister of Justice: a conceptual framework for 
the quality of legislation. The framework consisted of six elements.  
 
1. Legality (conformity with (higher) law) and Realization of general principles of law 
2. Effectivity and Efficiency 
3. Subsidiarity and Proportionality (level of regulation, costs/profits) 
4. Feasibility and Enforceability 
5. Attunement with other regulations 
6. Simplicity, Clarity and Accessibility 
 
As you can see, jurists cannot count: if you count the six elements in that document of ’91 you 
will actually find twelve elements.  
 
And in fact the framework consists of more elements.  
- A preliminary question, but related to several indicators, is that of the necessity of drafting a 
law, of a legal instrument; although you can see it as a specimen of subsidiarity.  
                                                 
1 Dr. Gert-Jan Veerman has been working at the ministry of Justice (department for the quality of legislation) 
and is professor at Maastricht University (Law, especially Legislation and its Quality). 
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- Not specifically mentioned, but incorporated in the concept of law are ideas of  
generality and  equality (laws are ment to regulate more people, in more situations, at 
different times) and ideas of continuity and stability. Because of legal security you must not 
change laws too quickly. As you perhaps know, our concept of law stems from Enlightment, 
and includes the idea of self-binding of the citizens; so laws are made by the citizens 
themselves, for the common good, equally binding for all citizens, basis for the powers 
executed by their Administration, and not kept secret.    
 
These twelve or more elements were formulated as Quality-indicators of legislation. Now, it 
is quite clear that most indicators are of a rather general nature. That was clear to the drafters 
responsible for the ‘91-document which contained these elements. Some clarification was 
given. In the afterwards set up recommendations for law-making, the Aanwijzingen voor de 
regelgeving- binding for the civil servants who prepare legislation2-, these indicators were a 
bit more elaborated.3 In general they remain rather vague and open. That is understandable: 
you have to find an optimum of general rules which are yet specific enough to help you when 
you are making a concrete law. 
My colleagues of the Maastricht University4 did a research on the elaboration of the general 
quality-indicators and the more specific operationalization of these. I used much of their work 
in the following overview: 
 
Quality Indicator  Specifications   Remarks 
 
Legality Compatible with international law 
Compatible with EU-law 
Compatible with general principles of 
law, like equality and legal protection 
Compatible with the Constitution 
Main clauses and provisions have to be 
set by a formal law 
Specify administrative powers 
Do not forget transition rules  
In the process of lawmaking, this item 
arises when there exists already a 
certain idea of necessity, goal and 
means. 
Effectivity Formulate clear goals 
Determine the relation between goals 
and means 
Determine targetgroups 
Determine the social playing field of 
the intended regulation 
Do not forget feasibility and 
enforceability 
Involve experts 
A shared definition of the problem and 
an adequate theory on the approach are 
crucial, at least in an instrumental 
concept of law and effectivity (but often 
impossible). 
A relation is supposed to exist between 
effectivity and legitimacy 
Efficiency Determine the burden of the intended 
law for the Administration, citizens and 
for trade and industry 
Choose the alternative with the lowest 
costs 
Predict desirable and undesirable 
effects 
Involve experts and the executive 
powers  
 
Use the Environmental Effect 
Test (MET) and the Business 
Effect Test (BET) 
Notify the administrative costs 
                                                 
2 Only for them, the Aanwijzingen don’t have a legal status in the sense that you can invoke them e.g. in court.  
3 Besides, this document contains a lot of handy and practicle instructions when drafting a law. 
4 S. Klosse,  M.Peeters, S. Ubachs, L. Verheij (ed.), Op zoek naar kwaliteit ( in search of quality), Sdu, 2003 
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(ACTAL). 
Feasibility or 
Practicability 
Determine the executive bodies and 
Their powers 
Determine the relation to other bodies 
Confine/ limit the amount of moments 
for decision, also with an eye on legal 
remedies 
Adjust time for implementation 
Consider provisions for control 
Involve the executive powers 
 
 
 
Enforceability Formulate as simple and unambiguous 
as possible 
Avoid exeptions 
Choose out of different methods and 
their legal basis 
Involve the Law-Enforcement powers, 
like police and public prosecution 
Do not forget the possibilities of factual 
control. 
 
Use the Compliance-Test (the so-
called T11). 
Subsidiarity and 
proportionality 
Give room to selfregulation 
Study whether existing laws can be 
used 
Study whether instruments different 
from legislation can be used for 
attaining the goal 
Explicate the necessity of the 
regulation 
Put administrative tasks and powers on 
a level as low as possible 
Subsidiarity includes that 
Government is as restricted as 
possible in imposing a law 
 
The Supreme Court granted 
compensation for unproportional 
burdens 
Attunement Think of side-effects 
Think of other rules on the same object 
Think of comparable, concurring rules   
Do not deviate in specific laws from 
general rules and laws 
Notice that rules will operate in a semi-
autonomous social field with concurring 
rules; effectivity and feasibility are 
related to this issue.  
Simplicity, 
Clarity and 
Accessibility 
Explicate the regulation and the 
choices made 
The accessibility, the publication of 
laws in  the ‘Staatsblad’ is legally laid 
down. Nowadays legislation can be 
found on the internet 
(www.overheid.nl)  
 
With this overview of the Quality indicators and the principles attached to the concept of law, 
I showed you the Dutch conceptual framework for the Quality of Law. It is a framework, not 
more not less. It is generally agreed that these indicators are not sharply defined from each 
other. They overlap, like effectivity and feasibility. They sometimes are opposite to each 
other. For instance. Proportionality and subsidiarity can lead to a regulation consisting of 
general rules, delegated powers, specific rules and even more specific powers and rules; that 
can be a threat to the clarity of the regulation. Besides, such a delegation of powers may 
increase the need for inspection, which can lead to more administrative costs. In reverse, clear 
rules are mostly general or simple rules which can lead to inequality and uncertainty in the 
execution of the regulation and therefore be a threat to legality and enforceability. Legality on 
one hand and effectivity or efficiency on the other, can also be strained.  
You can consider these indicators as means to help you to take account of essential elements 
in the field of rule-making. 
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As I said, despite their elaboration the indicators are still rather open en vague. Because it is 
difficult to elaborate these substantive indicators further, quality can also be obtained by 
certain activities during the process of law-making. Sometimes this is recommended in the 
Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving. The activities can take the form of different types of ex 
ante evaluation or prognostic studies, consultation of experts and/ or consultation of the 
directly concerned people. In the Netherlands there is a lot of consultation. I would like to 
add: do not consult only the governors or boards, but also the people who do the jobs. These 
people can give more information about what a regulation will mean in practice.  
 
 
2. Indicators in some other bodies 
 
These Dutch indicators have some self-evidence. In litterature and other, more official 
documents reference is made to such or similar indicators. The Mandelkern Group on Better 
Regulation, a high-level advisory group installed by the EU-Commission in 2000, mentions 
e.g. seven core principles for good regulation:  
1. necessity,  
2. proportionality,  
3. subsidiarity,  
4. transparency,  
5. accountability,  
6. accessibility and  
7. simplicity.5  
 
The EU-commission started an Action Plan for simplification and better regulation (COM 
(2001) 726 def.) on the basis of this Mandelkern-report. 
 
The OECD launched in 1995 a checklist for regulatory decision-making, consisting of 10 
questions:  
1. Is the problem correctly defined 
2. Is government action justified 
3. Is regulation the best form of government action 
4. Is there a legal basis for regulation 
5. What is the appropriate level (s) of government  
6. Do the benefits of regulation justify the costs 
7. Is the distribution of effects across society transparent 
8. Is the regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible and accessible to users 
9. Have all interested parties had the opportunity to present their views 
10. How will compliance be achieved. 
 
 
Although these core principles and questions are not formulated in exact the same wording as 
the Dutch indicators, and although they pay more attention to the policy aspects and less to 
legal aspects, they reflect nevertheless the same ideas and considerations with respect to the 
preparation and drafting of a regulation. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Final report, 13-11-2001, p. i; p. 9,10 
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3. Some comment 
 
I make some remarks with respect to this framework. 
 
a. Although these indicators seem clear and are clear to some extent, their adjustment is not 
always easy. Even the relatively easy principle that regulations must be clear and accessible to 
those for who they are meant, contains in fact a big problem. In the first place you have to 
deal with many persons or other concerned, who have not the ability to understand every text; 
so a question is the level of writing: for a 12 year old schoolchild as newspapers seem to have 
in mind? Or do you have to keep in mind the special groups for which a law is meant: may a 
regulation for pharmacists be less easier than one for farmers, assumed that pharmacist have 
had more education than farmers?  Another problem with regard to ‘clarity’ is that a law has 
to be interpreted in the context of a legal framework- a legal document is most of the time 
difficult to understand if you are not familiar with legal texts and with the legal framework; 
that is even true for pharmacists. In practice, many people don’t read laws. Most people don’t, 
I’m afraid. Laws are working via intermediate bodies, which does not mean you do not have 
be as clear as possible.  
It is also difficult to be clear because, at least in Holland, many laws are in fact changes of 
existing laws. So you also must try to write your clauses in the style, system and idiom of that 
older law. 
 
b. My second remark is, as I said before, that you must use this scheme as an instrument not 
as a unbreakable law. This scheme and the indicators mentioned in it, represent an effort to 
bring some technical rationality in a  law-making process, that is highly political. I won’t say  
that the political process is not rational, but it is a rationality different from ‘legality’ or 
‘effectiviness of the regulation’. For political reasons it can be very wise to produce vague 
rules or to choose not the most efficient solution of a problem.6  
The indicators for the quality of legislation hide in a way the different rationalites and 
interests that are connected with a law. Because laws reflect most of the time a compromise 
between several concerns and interests of different people and organizations and/ or of several 
rationalities7. The juridical and economic interests, or the juridical and political interests can 
differ strongly. So in general terms: legal values versus policy-values, and besides the law-
technical considerations. 
   
You also may, in this respect, observe that laws have different functions: they lay down the 
result of political negotiations, they are symbols of the norms and values of the ruling classes, 
they must be helpful to solve problems in society, they transfer a problem from the national 
agencies to other (governmental) bodies. The specific content and meaning of the indicators 
depend probably on the function you want to adjust to a specific law. 
 
In this respect, our experience in Holland, where we have juridical specialists for drafting 
bills, is that often there exists a tension between the juridical educated drafters of a bill and 
their colleagues of the policy- and/ or financial departments within a ministry. That is also 
true for our ministry of Environmental Affairs. Both categories of civil servants stand for 
legitimate values, but they are not necessarily in harmony. In other countries drafters and 
                                                 
6 It is even possible that a compromise about the content of a law is part of a broader negotion between political 
actors, or of a package-deal and has in fact little to do with the content of the law itself.  
7 Snellen mentions the economic, financial, legal, technical (the solution of the problem) and political 
rationalities; these rationalities are autonomous conceptual fields. 
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policymakers are not organized in separate departments; I guess the problem is the same but 
figures more inside, within the mind of the drafting policy-makers. 
 
These often opposing interests, functions and rationalities also mean that, although it is 
necessary to consult the people and institutions concerned, the consultation of the publc will 
possibly not lead to a regulation which will please all of them. Mostly, there are people who 
have ‘to pay’ for the solution. It may be possible to formulate a compromise. But that often 
means an open and  general clause or a very very specified regulation. Both have their side-
effects. Sometimes, government has to choose. 
  
c. Thirdly, a major problem is that developing a policy and drafting a regulation 
accompanying that policy, are largely based on expectations, expectations about how the 
arrangement and measures will work. Mostly, the solutions are sold as the best solution, the 
one and only way to solve the problem, but in fact it is a question of hope and prayer. Making 
law and policy is ‘governing in the mist’, as the Dutch scholar Scheltema once said. Policy-
making is in fact often strongly a case of experiment.  
In Holland we have a mechanism within the civil service that when necessary, some impact-
analyses have to be executed. You find them in the overview. I think that this practice started 
in the field of environmental law. Prognostic studies or impact-assessments were structurally 
build in the legislative and decision-making process. These tests don’t guarantee certainty or 
the truth about the effects of a intended regulation either. I remember that American research 
in the seventies revealed that the prognoses mostly were not very correct- the most important 
thing was that much attention was paid to the subject ‘environment’. 
 
d. Fourthly, one could state that the most important aspect of the quality of a law exists in fact 
outside that law: the implementation of the law and the policy formulated therein. That means 
that money, time, personnel, skills, priorities and so on within the executive powers and other 
also private institutions, are safeguarded.  
 
e. Finally: keep in mind that no rule can be perfect. There are too many people involved in too 
many roles and with too many concerns. There is a time gap between preparation and 
operating of the law, a law is rather digital and it will operate in a analogue reality. Besides, a 
rule does not land in a social vacuum but it must find its way in a semi-autonomous social 
field (Sally Moore), and has, so to say, to compete with existing rules and power-relations in 
that field. You may not expect that your bill will work as intended. People work with it, or 
against it. 
 
 
4. Has the framework any impact?  
 
There does not exist much research-based knowledge about the use and effects of the 
conceptual framework. What exists is this. In the earlier mentioned research of my 
Maastricht-colleages it appeared, although it was not the main question,  that attention had 
been paid to several aspects of the conceptual framework.  But a –small- research to the way 
in which this framework played a role in the thinking and operating of legislative civil 
servants, revealed that they do not think systematically of the framework. They use it when it 
suits them. 
 
In my observation, the conceptual framework is a factor for furthering the quality of 
legislation. It provides a clue for judging the quality of draft bills. The Indicators ask for 
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attention to be paid to different aspects, ask for consideration and discusssion. In my work I 
can notice that the check by the ministry of Justice leads to discussions between the 
colleagues about the content and the wording of the draft bills and to real changes in text or 
explanation. When they cannot come to agreement, the problem can be raised to the ministers 
concerned or even to the Council of Ministers. That happens. It depends on the mutual 
relations within the Council and the authority of the minister of Justice how often and how 
much he can influence the legislation of his colleages. The minister of Justice has, of course, a 
delicate position: he has his responsibility for the quality of Dutch legislation, but therefore he 
has to enter the substantial field, the responsibilities and powers of his fellow ministers; so he 
shall only intervene in important matters and not too often. This has an effect on the 
negotiations between the civil servants. Although the ministry of Justice will not win always, 
its civil servants have some influence. Possibly plays a role that after the decision in the 
Council of Ministers about a draft-bill, the Council of State gives an advisory opinion on that 
draft, an opinion that has to be made public.8  
  
The Indicators make sense. The existence of the framework provides civil servants an official 
support to invoke the quality-indicators and protect the several rationalities and interests, and 
raises therefore the chance that regulation will be better. But in the end, the political 
rationality wins, and that is what we wanted. 
 
 
 
5. Final remark 
 
Indonesia consists of many islands and regions and, as I understood, there is a policy of 
decentralization, also in the field of environmental law. In terms of our Indicators you try to 
come up to subsidiarity and proportionality. It also can contribute to some effectivity and 
feasibility. On the other hand, there are risks in terms of clarity, equality, enforceability and 
control. 
 
It is awful. Laws have a paradoxical connotation.  
Laws are made to give security and clarity in human relations. It limits freedom, but because 
of that it also provides freedom.  
When room is given and rules are aimed at the own responsibility of people and institutions, 
the complaint is that the rules are too open and you don’t know what to do; when justice is 
done to the specific situations in reality, the complaint is that rules are too precise and don’t 
give any room for people’s own, inventive behaviour. 
The goal and profit of a law often is the common good, the costs are often laid down at 
particular subjects- they complain. What is security for one, can be a burden for another.   
And finally, the political field in which a law is made, differ strongly from the social field in 
which the same law is operating; the same law consists, so to say, at least of two different 
laws. 
 
One will never make the perfect law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The Council of State uses more or less the same criteria as the mentioned Indicators. 
